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Virtual attacks are forming a new threat scenario for governments and other actors of global society. The first decade of 
the XXI century saw an intensification of cyberattacks on government networks which could not be traced back. However, 
due to political circumstances there were often actors suspected of being involved in cyberattacks. This case study is 
analyzing the methods and reasons of potential attackers in Russia and China which between 2004 and 2009 appeared 
in several cyber threat scenarios. 
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Ataques virtuais representam um novo cenário de ameaça para governos e outros atores da sociedade global. Durante a 
primeira década do século XXI houve uma intensificação de ataques cibernéticos de origem desconhecida contra redes 
governamentais. Porém, devido às circunstâncias políticas, muitas vezes havia atores suspeitos de estarem envolvidos 
em ataques virtuais. Essa pesquisa de caso está analisando os métodos e razões dos atacantes potenciais na Rússia e na 
China, os quais apareceram em vários cenários de ameaças cibernéticas entre 2004 e 2009.
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In January 2009 the US administration under then recently elected US President Obama released a new US Agenda for Homeland Security underli-ning growing attention to virtual attacks and cyber-security by announcing the position of a national 
cybersecurity advisor reporting directly to the President. 
Four months later, in May 2009, Obama confirmed his 
plans during a speech in the White House, without ha-
ving appointed an advisor so far. When in September 
2009 Melissa Hathaway resigned from her position as the 
Acting Senior Director for Cyberspace for the National 
Security and Homeland Security Councils, speculations 
about the difficulties to find a qualified candidate to co-
ordinate national cybersecurity issues in the US started 
putting pressure on the US administration (Nakashima, 
2009). In those first eight months of hesitation hundreds of 
cyberattacks happened on governmental and private eco-
nomy severs in the US and other countries. Most of them 
were not covered in the media and many stayed unknown 
even to the institutions or companies being attacked. In 
most cases it was unclear where the attackers agitated from 
or what their intentions were. Nevertheless in some cases 
cybersecurity experts succeed to trace back online attacks 
although they hardly had any legal possibilities against the 
possible attackers due to the borderless character of the 
Internet and the lack of appropriate policies or legal fra-
meworks. In other cases political circumstances alluded 
to where attackers might have come from and what their 
intentions were. 
The US are not the only victim of cyberattacks. Almost 
all states have suffered virtual attacks in the past ten years 
but so far only few resulted in serious concerns or have 
been made public. While some (and those are more rele-
vant for this article) have a political background, others are 
more connected to criminal activites. As being among the 
strongest global economies with a well developed telecom-
munication infrastructure the US are having high interests 
in protecting their networks from such hostile activities. 
Therefore they have a crucial role in developing means of 
protection against virtual attacks (and probably seeking 
ways to launch attacks by themselves). Besides them also 
the European Union is addressing the problem and wa-
tching global developments with concern, discussing cy-
bersecurity policies.
Concerns over cybersecurity in the past five years have 
frequently included Russia and China, both fast growing 
Internet markets and several times being suspected of 
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Robert Stakes divides case studies into three categories: 
intrinsic, instrumental and collective case studies. This 
way he tries to differentiate the motives of the researchers. 
An intrinsic study aims at understanding the case itself. 
The case is the central aspect of the study. The objective is 
nor the development of theories neither the analysis of a 
phenomenon behind the case. An instrumental study tre-
ats the case as an example for a theory or a political or so-
cial phenomenon. This phenomenon is the actual interest 
of the researcher. The case helps to explain it. The third 
category is a collective case study. The researcher uses it 
to investigate several cases that help to explain a certain 
phenomenon. Similar to Stakes, Robert Yin divides case 
studies into two categories: single-case studies and multi-
ple-case studies (Yin, 2002, p. 45f). Both have the intent to 
explain the phenomenon behind the case.
This present case study is designed as a multiple, ins-
trumental case study (n=2) to analyze the social pheno-
menon of virtual attacks on nation states and 
the question of responsibility for such attacks. 
The focus lies on virtual aggressions between 
2004 and 2009 being traced back by the vic-
tims to China and Russia. The intention is to 
analyse information about virtual attacks as 
a social phenomenon and about the possibilities to trace 
them back to their origin. The leading research questions 
are: What are the main kinds of cyberthreats and virtual 
attacks pointed against political and economical networks? 
How is it possible to trace virtual attacks back to the at-
tacker? Who is using virtual attacks against political and 
economical networks and with what kind of intention? 
What roles do Russia and China have concerning virtual 
attacks on foreign networks?
 The concept of cybersecurity
Cybersecurity as a concepts has numerous different 
dimensions. This chapter is going to categorize the diffe-
rent dimensions of cybersecurity being cybercrime, cyber-
terrorism, and cyberwarfare. After that different forms of 
virtual attacks will be discussed in general as well as the 
question how they were conducted in the past years.
In the context of online security, cybersecurity could be 
a simple form of private protection against spam or other 
malware distributed on the Internet. It could also mean 
protection of family members (for example children) from 
accessing unwanted web content. Furthermore it means 
protection from ordinary crime or fraud occuring on the 
internet like phishing, identity theft, credit card fraud and 
others (McQuade III, 2006, p. 63ff). These types of activi-
ties are categorized as cybercrime. Cybercrime as a pheno-
menon plays a minor role in this article. Although, as the 
using their IT infrastructure to infiltrate other countries’ 
networks. This article will concentrate on the problem of 
virtual attacks and the role the two countries had in this 
context between 2004 and 2009. Regarding Russia espe-
cially the 2004 cyberattacks in Estonia and also the 2008 
attacks on Georgia will be discussed. The Chinese case in-
cludes GhostNet, an espionage network that was investiga-
ted by Canadian researchers in 2008/2009.
The article is structured in six chapters. After this in-
troduction, the second chapter is going to introduce the 
research method applied and will present the research 
questions. The third chapter concentrates on the general 
phenomenon of cybersecurity. It includes the theoreti-
cal basic knowledge regarding cybersecurity, cybercrime, 
cyberterror, and cyberwar. Furthermore it discusses di-
fferent methods of cyberattacks. The forth and fifth chap-
ter are analysing the two cases of Russia and China and 
their function in recent cyberattacks on other countries. 
Following those two, the final conclusion will pick up the 
research questions again to develop final statements regar-
ding the problem underlying this article. 
Research methodology 
This article is going to analyse the current situation of 
cybersecurity regarding nation states with a focus on vir-
tual attacks and the question who is responsible for them. 
A special focus is given on Russia and China which in the 
past five years have been accused several times by Western 
governments of undertaking virtual attacks on govern-
mental institutions and private companies in different 
countries. The research method applied is the qualitati-
ve case study design. “A case study (...) is the analysis of 
an object: a country, a political system, an institution, an 
organization, or a problem in a certain context (...). In a 
comparative analyses different cases on the same topic are 
used.”(Nohlen, 1994, p. 128, translated by the author).  The 
case study design is among the most applied methods in 
political research. Its origin goes back to 1948 at Harvard 
University (McNabb, 2004, p. 357). It helps to explain an 
individual case and is also able to make a generalization 
(although quantitative methods are stronger for genera-
lization). It can be conducted with one or several cases. 
“Through the study of cases, political scientists are able to 
learn about political events, agencies, parties and levels of 
government and politics around the globe. Cases are also 
written to serve as examples of approved management 
practices.” (McNabb, 2004, p. 357). 
Almost all states have suffered virtual attacks in the 
past ten years but so far only few resulted in serious 
concerns or have been made public. 
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following paragraphs will demonstrate, cybercrime itself 
does not have a purely economic side but also contains po-
litical interests which are closely connected to the aspects 
being investigated on the following pages. Examples for 
political cybercrimes are hate speech and cyberterrorist 
activities. 
Hate speech usually refers to 
racist, anti-semitic or anti-ziga-
nistic content that is clearly of po-
litical nature but also treated as a 
cybercrime when it happens onli-
ne. Cyberterrorism (or cyberter-
ror) however is a more complex 
concept. It could be treated as a cybercrime in certain cases 
like the distribution of information to produce explosive 
devices. Nevertheless as the case of three young men in the 
UK shows, governments are tending to recognize such ac-
tivities as acts of terrorism rather than simple cybercrimes 
(Stevens, 2008). 
Terrorist groups are using the Internet for a wide spec-
trum of activities ranging from spreading information and 
propaganda, over networking and recruiting, until mobili-
zation and fundraising (Weimann, 2006, p. 111ff). Mehan 
(2008) defines cyberterror as “the politically-motivated use 
of computers by terrorist groups, sub-nationals, or clan-
destine agents as weapons or as targets intended to result 
in violence, influence an audience, or affect national poli-
cies.“ (Mehan, 2008, p. 33). It is based on two definitions 
given by 1) the 22 US Code, section 2656, and 2) the US 
National Infrastructure Protection Division (NIPD). The 
first one mentioned concentrates on terrorism in general 
and says that it can be described as “premeditated, politi-
cally motivated violence perpetrated against non-comba-
tant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience.“ (Mehan, 2008, 
p. 32). Following the NIPD “cyberterrorism is a criminal 
act perpetrated through computers resulting in violen-
ce, death and/or destruction, and creating terror for the 
purpose of coercing a government to change its policies.“ 
(Mehan,  2008, p. 32). A crucial point in Mehan’s defini-
tion is the clarification that computers can be used “as we-
apons or as targets“. This becomes clear when refering to 
Kerr’s earlier contribution to the discussion on cyberterror 
in which she mentioned that out of 109 definitions of cy-
berterror four mentioned all of the three main aspects 1) 
use of violence, 2) political objectives, and 3) the purpo-
se of  spreading fear within the population (Kerr, 2004). 
Nevertheless two of those definitions refer to computers 
as being targets, the other two as being means of an attack. 
Mehan assembled these two different approaches and cre-
ated a more complete definition of cyberterror.
The third category is cyberwarfare (or cyberwar). 
Cyberwarfare can be seen as a sub-category of information 
warfare, a term introduced by the US military in the 1980s 
which includes the domination of all possible means of in-
formation and communication (including psychological 
operations) to use them against the opponents. Different 
from information warfare, cyberwarfare is limited to the 
usage of computer networks to harm a country’s critical 
infrastructure. By definition of the European Commission, 
critical infrastructure stands for 
those physical and information technology fa-
cilities, networks, services and assets which, if 
disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious im-
pact on the health, safety, security or economic 
well-being of citizens or the effective functioning 
of governments in the Member States. Critical 
Infrastructures extend across many sectors of 
the economy, including banking and finance, 
transport and distribution, energy, utilities, he-
alth, food supply and communications, as well 
as key government services. (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2004, p. 3).
Other definitions like in a report of the US Congressional 
Research Service include basicly the same sectors (Moteff; 
Parfomak, 2004, p. 4).
Mehan distinguishes four different kinds of cyberwar: 
...Class I cyberwar is concerned with the protec-
tion of personal information...Class II cyberwar 
concerns itself with industrial and economic 
espionage...Class III cyberwar is officially about 
global war and terrorism... Class IV cyberwar is 
the use of all the techniques of Classes I-III in 
combination with military activities in an effort 
to obtain a battlefield advantage or a force multi-
plier. (Mehan, 2008, p. 28).
Early cyberwar attacks go back to the 1980s when the 
US used hacking methods to infiltrate computer networks 
of the Soviet Union, mainly with the intention of espiona-
ge. With the further development of IT networks in the 
1990s the Kosovo war in 1999 saw the first big application 
of cyberwar measures. While the US used different me-
Concerns over cybersecurity in the past five years have 
frequently included Russia and China, both fast growing 
Internet markets and several times being suspected of using 
their IT infrastructure to infiltrate other countries’ networks.
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thods to manipulate Serbian weapon and communication 
systems (Arkin, 1999; Dunn, 2001), also the Serbian and 
Albanian side used IT for their own interests. In most ca-
ses this involved spreading information and propaganda 
accusing the other side of war crimes and cruel activities 
but also to connect with supporters or diasporas in other 
countries. Furthermore NATO and US server and websi-
tes were attacked. When in May 1999 the US bombed the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, a wave of cyberattacks from 
China hit American and NATO infrastructure (Messmer, 
1999) many of them being denial of service (DoS) attacks 
conducted by private citizens from their home compute in 
what Timothy Thomas of the US Foreign Military Studies 
Office called a “take-home-battle“ (Thomas, 2000).
DoS attacks
Besides simple hacking activities to access information 
on foreign computers, spreading malware, or changing we-
bsite content (website defacement), DoS attacks are one of 
the most frequently used measures to conduct virtual at-
tacks. The effect of such an attack is the inability to access 
a network or information on a website. DoS attacks can 
cause massive data traffic on foreign networks which as a 
consequence break down temporarily. The better protected 
the network under attack, the higher the necessary num-
ber of attacking computers. While for a smaller network a 
few hundred computers can already cause problems with 
data processing, government networks or those of bigger 
companies are more difficult to corrupt. In that case dis-
tributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks can be operated 
as they include a higher number of computers that can be 
controlled by one single person. Before launching a DDoS 
attack the aggressor needs to get control over a number 
of computers which are usually kidnapped from ordina-
ry users who are unaware of their unwanted participation 
in the attack. To get access to other computers malicious 
codes distributed by spam, fraudulent websites, or other 
means of capture is connecting private user PCs to a con-
troling server. An aggressor can also easily get access to a 
required number of captured computers by simply hiring 
botnets online.
Botnets
Originating from the suffix of “robot“, a botnet consists 
of several computers under control of a single authority 
which can command the single units (drones) of the bot-
net to simultaneously access a hostile network at a chosen 
point of time. This kind of DDoS attacks based on bot-
nets are common virtual attacks and can be executed by 
a single person. Botnets are offered for hire to cybercri-
minals, cyberterrorists, cyberwarriors or any individual on 
the Internet. Contact between supplier and renter can be 
made on several forums on the Internet. The prices differ 
from 50 US$ per day for a small botnet up to thousands 
of dollars for more complex networks. In 2009 huge bot-
nets existed consisting of millions of captured computers 
(GRANT 2009). Generating botnets became a worthwhile 
business supplying thousands of cyber aggressors who al-
together paid a few million dollars to botnet providers.
Virtual attacks and their origins
The majority of virtual attacks stays unknown. 
Whenever detected by the attacked, the first priority for 
the victims is to reduce damage. Especially larger compa-
nies but also governmental institutions suffer frequent cy-
berattacks although they do not necessarily cause serious 
damage nor do they regularly have a political background. 
The reasons for not publicly debating all virtual attacks 
are therefore a question of quantity and (lack of) quality 
of the attacks, but also to hide vulnerability of the victim. 
A public or private entity being known for its defectivness 
towards virtual attacks (and therefore sensitivity for espio-
nage) would easily loose its reputation which could cost 
clients, partners, or votes. Cyberattacks that do appear in 
the media are usually 1) of larger dimension, 2) have a se-
rious economical or political impact, or 3) are published 
in strategic moments. One example for the first two cate-
gories (which will be further discussed later in this article) 
are the attacks on Estonia in 2007 when both the questions 
of dimension and seriousness came together. Also the cy-
berattacks during the Caucasus war in August 2008 belong 
to these categories.
Two examples for virtual attacks that were published at 
strategic moments are the attacks on German, British, and 
US government networks publicly announced in August 
2007, and the DDoS attacks on US American and South 
Korean government and business websites in July 2009. In 
the first example the German magazine Spiegel revealed on 
25 August 2007 that cyberattacks on German government 
institutions like the Ministry of Exterior, the Ministry of 
Research, the Ministry of Economy and the office of chan-
celor Angela Merkel had happened with the intention of 
installing spyware. The actual problem had already been 
recognized by IT security analyst months before but beca-
me a bigger issue at the dawn of Chancelor Merkels visit 
to the Chinese government starting on 26 August 2009. In 
the following week the Spiegel and other newspapers addi-
tionally published articles about similar incidents in the 
US and the UK which also had happened some time before 
already (Spiegel Online, 2007b; Sueddeutsche.de, 2007b). 
The intention of this strategically published articles to start 
a German-Chinese dialogue on the issue was successful. 
Chancelor Merkel and Premier Wen Jiaboa discussed the 
issue with the result that Wen declared the rejection of the 
Chinese government to conduct cyberattacks. Contrary to 
this statement the German Domestic Intelligence Agency 
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(Verfassungsschutz) declared having traced back the atta-
ckers to computers of the Chinese Army (Spiegel Online, 
2007a).
While the case of the German government networks 
was discovered long before its coverage in the media, 
the example of the 2009 DDoS attacks on the USA and 
South Korea did happen at a strategic moment and were 
immediately published. On the American Independence 
Day July 4 2009, 27 US governmental and later also bu-
siness networks became victims of a DDoS attack which 
later was expanded on South Korean official and private 
economy networks. Some of the victims in the US were 
the Treasure Department, the Secret Service, the Federal 
Trade Commission, the White House, and the New York 
Stock Exchange while in South Korea the Presidential 
Blue House, the Ministry of Defense and the National 
Assembley were being attacked. The botnet used to con-
duct the DDoS attack consisted of 50.000-65.000 compu-
ters and can therefore be considered a smaller incident. 
Nevertheless several systems under attack broke down for 
up to five days. Further risks like the possible abstraction 
of information shortly before the attack were mentioned 
by the Commission on Cybersecurity but could not be 
proven (Chabrow, 2009).
South Korean intelligence analysts suspected foreign 
governments or pro-foreign government groups without 
directly mentioning North Korea. US American IT secu-
rity experts assessed the attack to be little sophisticated 
judging from the simple character of the scripts used. 
This would also weaken the theory of the Commission on 
Cybersecurity about the probability of an act of espionage. 
What was expressed by the American analysts is that the 
script refered to China’s internal routing system and that 
it contained data that could be traced back to a Korean-
language browser (Markoff; Sang-Hun, 2009).
Besides China, Russia is the second country that is men-
tioned above average when it comes to cyberattacks. From 
January to March 2009 different embassies of Azerbaijan, 
Ethiopia, India and Portugal have reportedly been un-
der virtual attacks (Constantin, 2009a). In the months 
before, also embassies and consulates of Brazil, France, 
the Netherlands, Syria and the US suffered cyberattacks 
(Constantin, 2009b). As cyberattackers usually do not le-
ave written messages justifying their course of action it is 
difficult to analyse the reasons for all virtual attacks whi-
ch happen and become public. Nevertheless in some cases 
like the parallel attacks on different websites connected to 
the Azerbaijanian government in March 2009, it is possi-
ble to draw relations to offline politics. During the week of 
the attacks, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrovis 
was visiting Azerbaijan while Azerbaijans President Ilham 
Aliyev left the country to visit Iran. Although this still le-
aves open the question how this act was interpreted by 
the cyberattackers who were described by an IT security 
analyst as members of the Russian cybercrime organiza-
tion Russian Business Network (RBN), a non-registered 
company working on an anonymous basis using more 
than a dozen synonyms in different countries. The RBN 
can be seen as a crucial non-state actor in cyberattacks 
world wide, whose members act as mercenaries for politi-
cal or private economy interests. 
Whenever virtual attacks on governmental institu-
tions are discussed the question of responsibility comes 
up. Although in many and especially in cases of serious 
damage governmental representatives express suspicions, 
which are usually based on general political circumstances 
or on results of IT security analysts, it is almost impossible 
to prove where cyberattacks come from due to the charac-
ter of the networks or the fact that botnets are used who-
se drones do not lead to the location of the real attacker. 
Furthermore cyber aggressors could use proxy servers 
to disguise their real location. Also the attack on the US 
American electricity grid in April 2009 lead to statements 
by US officials holding China and Russia responsible for 
infiltrating critical infrastructure on US territory without 
being able to prove it (Gorman, 2009). So far it is uncle-
ar in International Law what rights states have to react on 
virtual attacks. It is undefined if cyberattacks can be ca-
tegorized as “armed attacks“ which would give states the 
possibility of self-defense following article 51 of the UN 
Charta. Moreover it is open who they could attack as an 
act of self-defense. 
Russia
Following the 2008 data of the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU Internet Statistics 2008), 
32,11% of Russia’s 140 million inhabitants were using the 
Internet in 2008, 21,49% had their own Internet access. The 
country has one of the fastest growing Internet populations 
in Europe and the bordering regions. Following a research 
report of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism 
at the University of Oxford, Russian users are mostly in-
terested in websites containing sports, music, social acti-
vities and other forms of entertainment (Fossato; Lloyd; 
Verkhofsky, 2008, p. 14) plus the steadily growing blogos-
phere which had about 3,8 million blogs in 2008 (Fossato; 
Lloyd; Verkhofsky, 2008, p. 14). Furthermore the report 
stated the Russian government under President Medvedev 
and former President Putin refrained so far from exten-
ded Internet regulations which fostered economic develo-
pment of the ICT market in recent years. Although some 
exceptions were made for the Federal Security Service FSB, 
which has the possibility to control Internet communica-
tion without knowledge of the Internet Service Providers 
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(ISP). 
However researchers of the OpenNet Inititative 
see Russia’s role in Internet regulation with more cri-
tical eyes. In a regional report about the Internet in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) the authors 
argue that in Russia (and other member states of the CIS) 
a general tendency “toward greater government regula-
tion of the Internet“ can be observed, “to bring it in line 
with existing regulations that control the mass media“ 
(Opennet Initiative). The authors also refer to the SORM 
II regulation which since the year 2000 offers the FSB ad-
vanced possibilities to control Internet communication 
within Russia. SORM II is comparable to a number of laws 
and regulations passed in the USA after 9/11 like the US 
Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act or 
parts of the Patriot Act.
The percentage of Russian Internet users who go onli-
ne for political reasons is quite small. Political activism on 
the net does partly happen but is also closely watched by 
national authorities. Nevertheless Russian communication 
networks have played a crucial role during political crises 
or conflicts with the nation’s neigbouring countries in the 
past five years. The two major events in this context are the 
conflicts with Estonia in April 2007 and with Georgia in 
August 2008. Both countries have a tense relation to Russia 
due to their history as members of the Soviet Union. The 
following paragraphs will concentrate on both crises in 
which cyberattacks happened on the critical infrastructure 
of the two countries.
Estonia
As many East European countries also Estonia has a 
multi-ethnic population, made up mainly of Estonians, 
Russians, and other smaller minority groups. Early Russian 
settlements in Estonia go back to the 17th century when 
a few thousand Russians migrated to the neighbouring 
country escaping religious persecution in Russia. During 
WWII Estonia was occupied by Russia in 1940 and got 
back its independece only in 1991. During these five de-
cades of being part of the Soviet Union, Moscow forced its 
own population policy on Estonia in the same manner as 
on other countries and regions within their sphere of po-
wer (Rannut, 2004). Thousands of Estonians were settled 
by force to the Russian main territory while thousands of 
Russians moved to Estonia. By this measures the Russian 
part of the population of Estonia went up from 8% before 
the occupation to about 30% until 1991. This percentage 
went down to around 25% after the independence of the 
country.
As Russian used to be the official language for 50 ye-
ars, many Russians never learnt to speak Estonian. With 
the independence also the Estonian language was reins-
talled as the official language of the country, leaving the 
problem, that about 85% of the Russian minority were not 
able to speak the new official language, which was 21% of 
the country’s whole population. Since then ethnic mino-
rity rights has been a constant challenge for Estonia and 
relations between Estonians and Russians were tensious at 
certain moments (Lang, 2008; Vetik, 1993).
One of this moments was the decision of the Estonian 
government in April 2007 to remove a statue of a Russian 
soldier from a central place in the capitol Tallinn to move 
it to a military cemetary outside the city center. The statue 
had been placed in the center of town by Moscow in 1947 
to celebrate the end of WWII. 
The Estonian population con-
sidered it a symbol of occupa-
tion. The moment to remove 
the statue at the end of April 
was strategically chosen as the 
Russian-speaking minority 
used to meet  frequently at the 
statue on 9 May to celebrate 
the end of WWII. 
The decision to relocate the statue caused protests main-
ly under young Russian-speaking Estonians that turned to 
riots on 26-27 April during which one person was killed 
and more than 1000 were arrested. In the days after the 
unrests Russia critized Estonia for its decision regarding 
the statue and requested the resignation of the government 
in Tallinn while anti-Estonian manifestations took place in 
front of the Estonian embassy in Moscow (Sueddeutsche.
de, 2007a).
At the same time when the unrests started, cyberat-
tacks were launched on several parts of the Estonian IT 
infrastructure (Hansen; Nissenbaum, 2009, p. 1168f). In 
the years before, the country had built up a highly sophis-
ticated network environment ranking under the most de-
veloped systems worldwide. E-government services were 
implemented ranging from simple administration services 
to online elections. Today besides governmental services 
also the banking system and other sectors are based to an 
above average degree on IT networks. Due to the cybe-
rattacks carried out for about three weeks, large parts of 
While the case of the German government networks was 
discovered long before its coverage in the media, the example 
of the 2009 distributed denial of service (DDoS)  attacks on the 
USA and South Korea did happen at a strategic moment and 
were immediately published. 
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the country’s infrastructure suffered breakdowns, inclu-
ding governmental and banking infrastructure, and seve-
ral online news services. To protect its infrastructre from 
foreign attacks Estonian Internet Service Providers (ISP) 
blocked online queries from outside the national borders. 
This also caused access problems for a great number of 
companies and private clients to financial resources within 
the Estonian Hansabank (Swedbank), one of the biggest 
financial institutions of the Baltic re-
gion. The attacks differed from similar 
incidents in other countries because of 
its comprehensive character impacting 
a whole country instead of individual 
institutions. Being concerned about the 
occurences also the European Union 
condemned the attacks although due 
to the upcoming EU-Russian summit 
officials refrained from addressing 
Moscow for possible responsibility. 
The NATO sent IT security analysts to 
Tallinn to investigate. One year later the alliance opened 
up its Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 
Tallinn (Lang, 2008, p. 6).
Due to the political circumstances Estonian officials 
accused the Russian government to be responsible for 
the attacks while Moscow denied having any relations to 
it. Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet and Minister of 
Justice Rein Lang both declared that IT analysis had pro-
ven the involvement of Russian government computers in 
the attacks. In this context they also mentioned the invol-
vement of Russian Presidential administration networks in 
the attacks (Spiegel Online, 2007c).
Besides individual cases of webdefacement on govern-
mental websites, DoS attacks were the main method used 
to interfere with Estonian infrastructure. Before and du-
ring the attacks, in several Russian webforums patriotic 
hackers informed users (especial the younger generation, 
so called script kiddies) how to participate in cyberattacks 
on Estonia. Driven by patriotic outrage there was a gro-
wing number of young Internet users in Russia wanting to 
harm Estonia by attacking its infrastructure. Nevertheless, 
the most serious attacks were the ones that had botnets 
involved controlled by more advanced attackers. Botnets 
used during the attacks consisted of drones from seve-
ral countries including the Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Peru, 
Russia, the USA and Vietnam. This way hundreds of thou-
sands of computers were guided to attack specific points 
at the same moment. IT analysts observing the attacks 
discovered that concentrated attacks started and ended 
at fixed points of time (after exactly two weeks) proving 
the use of botnets. Also the qualitative level of the more 
serious attacks pointed out that professional hackers were 
behind them (Davis, 2007). Additionally, some of the at-
tacks happening during the day stopped at midnight (Faz.
net, 2007). This fact suggested that hired botnets (that are 
usually paid per day) were in use which implies high costs 
for the attackers that can barely be carried by individual 
Internet users. Furthermore analysts from the IT security 
company Arbor Networks discovered, that some of the bo-
tnets used against Estonia were just a few weeks earlier em-
ployed to disturb the IT presence of an alliance of Russian 
opposition parties (Davis, 2007).
Estonian officials constantly blamed the Russian gover-
nment to be responsible for the attacks, but this accusation 
could never been proven. Russia always denied having any 
responsibility but hardly considered to clear up the oc-
curences by activating its secret service FSB. Due to the 
SORM II regulation mentioned above, the FSB has con-
trol over all Internet traffic in Russia. Although SORM II 
was developed to control the Internet for security reasons 
President Putin (a former FSB director) did not initiate an 
investigation. 
In January 2008 a 20-year-old Russian Estonian was ar-
rested and fined in the Baltic republic for conducting cybe-
rattacks on Estonian infrastructure (Kirk, 2008). However, 
the facts presented above make clear that highly sophisti-
cated actors were behind the attacks and not just a group 
of patriotic script kiddies. After two years without further 
clarifying information, Russian State Dume Deputy and 
member of the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary 
Assembley of the Council of Europe (PACE) Sergei 
Markov (accidently) revealed that one of his assistants was 
responsible for the cyberattacks. This man was later iden-
tified as Konstantin Goloskokov, a leading member of the 
Nashi youth movement, an organization founded by Putin 
supporter Vladislav Surkov in March 2005. Goloskokov 
confirmed his responsibility in the attacks. In an interview 
given to the Financial Times in March 2009 he stated that 
he and other members of his organization simply accessed 
Estonian websites until they crashed (Clover, 2009). In the 
interview he pointed out that all activities were undertaken 
without governmental instructions or support. 
Considering the impact of the cyberattacks it is un-
Especially larger companies but also governmental 
institutions suffer frequent cyberattacks although they do 
not necessarily cause serious damage nor do they regularly 
have a political background. The reasons for not publicly 
debating all virtual attacks are a question of quantity 
and (lack of) quality of the attacks, but also to hide 
vulnerability of the victim. 
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likely that Goloskokov and his colleagues brought down 
the infrastructure of the whole country just by accessing 
websites. More interesting is to consider the possibility of 
Nashi being involved in concentrated botnet attacks. The 
organization had more than 120.000 members in 2008 and 
is famous for its street activities against Russian opposition 
parties. It was also involved in violent protests against the 
Estonian embassy in Moscow in May 2007. Estimations 
by the German Institute for Peace Research and Security 
Policy say that the Putin administration supported Nashi 
and other youth organizations with several 100.000 US 
dollars per month. Nashi’s anual summer camp had an 
estimated budget of 6-7 million US dollars (Heller, 2008). 
Considering the costs for  hiring extensive botnets how 
they were used against Estonia, Nashi exhibits not only 
strong motivation and confessing members but also pos-
sesses the necessary financial resources.
Georgia
The cyberattacks in July and August 2008 against 
Russia’s neighbouring country Georgia happened in the 
context of the enduring conflict between the two countries 
over South Ossetia. The legal status of this Caucasian re-
gion has been the reason for disputes and military con-
frontations for several generations in history. During the 
Soviet Union a constant support of new Ossetian settle-
ments by Moscow and a parallel relocation of Georgians 
from the region lead to a growing Ossetian population 
which today is about 66% in South Ossetia compared to 
29% Georgians. It remained an autonomous region within 
the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic until 1990 when it 
declared its independence which was not recognized by 
any other state. Since then Georgia claimed the region as 
part of its own state (independent since 1991) and is sup-
ported by the majority of states of the international com-
munity. Moscow supported the demand for independence 
and offered Russian citizenship to the inhabitants of the 
region for which reason about 90% of the population in 
South Ossetia is today formally Russian. 
Since the 1990s the conflict in the region resulted in 
numerous military disputes which were interrupted by 
phases of relative peace which was common also in other 
Caucasian countries after the end of the Soviet Union and 
described by researchers as “frozen conflict“ (Borgen, 
2009). Others questioned this term arguing that South 
Ossetia and also Abkhazia showed continuously violent 
clashes between rivaling actors (König, 2006). In August 
2008 intensified clashes of the preceding months lead to an 
occupation of South Ossetia by Georgian troops, followed 
by a Russian invasion of South Ossetia and parts of Georgia 
as well as bombings of several Georgian cities (Closson; 
Halbach, 2008). After the withdrawal of Georgian troops a 
few days later, Russia officially recognized South Ossetia’s 
(and Abkhazia’s) independence in August 2008, later 
followed by Nicaragua (September 2008) and Venezuela 
(September 2009). This step can be interpreted as a con-
sequence of the independence of Kosovo, accepted by a 
number of Western states in February the same year, whi-
ch was emphatically critizised by the Russian government 
who is still concerned about independence struggles of a 
number of territories in the former Soviet region.
While violent outbreaks between Georgia and Russia 
had been a recurring phenomenon of the region since the 
early 1990s, the fights in August 2008 added a new com-
ponent to the conflict. Already before the occupation of 
South Ossetia started in August, virtual attacks were laun-
ched against several parts of the Georgian infrastructure. 
These attacks, which started in July 2008 (Adair, 2008), in-
cluded DDoS attacks, botnets, logic bombs and other mea-
sures. (A logic bomb is a piece of code which can be placed 
within a chosen part of an adversary’s IT infrastructure to 
be
 activated at a strategic moment of time. Once acti-
vated the code can harm the 
adversary’s IT system from the 
inside). 
Affected by the attacks 
in Georgia were mainly the 
President’s office and other governmental networks, finan-
cial networks, news services, and the US embassy. Before 
and during the virtual aggressions, potential targets were 
published on several Russian online discussion forums 
to mobilize patriotic hackers like it had happened in the 
Estonia attacks the year before. A large number of web-
sites targeted was blocked for several days. Some govern-
mental sites were moved to Turkish and US American ser-
vers to continue informing provisionary about the armed 
conflict in South Ossetia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
continued publishing information on a blog after its own 
network broke down (Waterman, 2008). Also cell phone 
services broke down as a consequence of the attacks on 
financial networks (Corbin, 2009). To secure their own ne-
tworks, foreign banks cut their connections to Georgian 
banks, leaving them isolated from the global financial sys-
tem. Besides the Georgian networks, also in Russia and 
South Ossetia virtual attacks on critical infrastructre took 
place, albeit to a lesser extend.
Joseph Nye later pointed out that never before, armed 
conflicts and virtual attacks had happened in combination: 
Besides China, Russia is the second country that is mentioned 
above average when it comes to cyberattacks. 
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“The Russia-Georgia conflict represents the first signifi-
cant cyberattacks accompanying armed conflict. Welcome 
to the twenty-first century.“ (Nye, 2008). Although as sta-
ted above, already the Kosovo conflict saw a combination 
of cyberwar measures and traditional armed aggressions, 
Nye is right that the Caucasus war 2008 included cyber 
measures on an intensified level compared to the Kosovo 
war in 1999. 
Similar to the attacks on Estonia, also the Georgian 
government accused Moscow for being responsible for 
the breakdown of governmental and civic infrastructure. 
Moscow again denied its respon-
sibility. There are different possi-
ble scenarios for who conducted 
virtual attacks on Georgia. They 
range from patriotic hackers over 
criminal organizations to the go-
vernmental level.
The involvement of patriotic hackers and script kiddies 
in virtual attacks against Georgia is a widely accepted fact. 
Corresponding discussions in Russian online forums in-
cluding instructions by experienced hackers and the sup-
ply of the necessary tools, but also the results of different 
IT security analysis have proven this to be true. Also the 
ongoing virtual attacks after the Russian government had 
officially ended its military campaign support this argu-
ment. Beyond that the Shadow Foundation, an organiza-
tion specialized in Internet security research, had watched 
a number of servers for an extended period of time (some 
for more than one year) before the same servers became 
involved in the Georgia attacks. As those servers had been 
used before August 2008 to commit ordinary criminal ac-
tivities which, following the researchers, were not connec-
ted to the Russian government, they concluded that the 
servers mentioned were rather used by individuals or cri-
minal organizations (Johnson, 2008). Although it could be 
possible to hire these services also with public resources. 
Looking at the participation of criminal organizations 
the situation becomes more complex. Besides providers 
of botnets, who can be considered cybercriminals as well, 
also the Russian Business Network (RBN) is a potential ac-
tor being involved in the attacks. As stated above, the ne-
twork functions as a non-registered company which is res-
ponsible for a high percentage (approximately 60%) of all 
cybercrime activities worldwide (Warren, 2007). In spite 
of its activities the RBN, operating from St. Petersburg, was 
never charged by Russian authorities. Its probable relations 
to political officials might be one of the reasons (idem). 
Nevertheless the network disappeared in November 2007 
and has since then been spotted on different locations 
outside of Russia, where the lack of IT policies and legal 
regulations facilitate their activities. The involvement of 
cybercriminal organizations in the attacks on Georgia and 
a certain level of cooperation with Russian officials were 
also confirmed by the US Cyber Consequence Unit’s re-
port handed to the US government in August 2009 (Kirk, 
2009).
Looking at the governmental level it is unlikely that 
the Kremlin was directly involved in any cyberattacks on 
Georgia. Although some aspect indicate that officials from 
the (lower) political spectrum and the military could have 
been involved or at least have cooperated with virtual atta-
ckers. One example is the coordination of timing and loca-
tion of both virtual and military strikes. On August 9, 2008 
cyberattacks that brought down news service stations in 
the Georgian city of Gori happened just moments before 
the Russian airforce bombed strategic goals in the same 
city (Goodwin, 2008). This indicates a certain form of co-
operation to prevent the spreading of information after 
the bomb attacks. Another indicator is the involvement of 
the two Russian government-controlled telecommunica-
tion companies Rostelecom and Comstar. Servers of both 
companies were identified having blocked Internet traffic 
going to Georgia as well as launching DDoS attacks against 
the country (Leyden, 2008). 
China 
The role of China in international telecommunication 
is seen as a complex and also complicated issue. Following 
the latest data of the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), China has 298 million Internet users leaving 
the USA with 230 million behind (ITU Internet Statistics 
2008). Due to its population size this number refers to 
only a small part of the whole country: around 22%, main-
ly situated in the urban centers of the country. While ICT 
companies and analysts see China as the market with the 
biggest growth potential for further investments, global 
civil society organizations and foreign (mainly Western) 
governments regularly complain about national Internet 
filter and censorship as well as constantly occuring cybe-
rattacks. Different than in the Russian case, cyberattacks 
from China have so far not targeted foreign networks in 
the same complexity and with comparable destructive re-
sults like in Estonia or Georgia. They were rather concen-
trated on individual networks in different countries often 
with the intention of espionage.
While violent outbreaks between Georgia and Russia had
 been a recurring phenomenon since the early 1990s, a new 
component was added to the August 2008 conflict in South 
Ossetia: virtual attacks were launched against several parts of 
the Georgian infrastructure. 
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Early cases of cyberattacks from China go back to the 
end of the 1990s. As a response to a massive demonstration 
of Falun Gong members in Beijing in April 1999, a number 
of servers in the USA, Canada and the UK hosting websi-
tes of the movement fell victim to cyberattacks (Wacker, 
2000, p. 36). In the same year cyberattacks happened on 
US networks after the bombing of the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade as stated above. Interesting to mention is in this 
context, that at that time the Internet was a relatively new 
network that was used only by a small percentage of the 
population, a big part of them being university members. 
In December 1999 only 3,5 million computers in China 
had access to the Internet. They were used by an estimated 
number of 8,9 million people, less than 1% of the whole 
population (Wacker, 2000, p. 11).
Over the years more similar attacks occured that were 
connected to particular events like an airplane accident in-
volving two machines from China and the USA, causing 
the death of the Chinese pilot in April 2001 (known as the 
Hainan Island incident). This crash resulted in massive 
cyberattacks from China on US governmental networks 
and vice versa (Smith, 2001). The attacks were conducted 
by Chinese and American patriotic hackers which openly 
declared responsibility on the net. While this “First World 
Hacker War“ (Smith, 2001), which caused serious dama-
ge to parts of American critical infrastructure (Cornish, 
2009, p. 14), was based on mutual cyber activities, in the 
following years China conducted more secret cyberatta-
cks, targeting public institutions in different countries with 
the intention to illegitimately transfer information to their 
own networks.
In the last five years especially Western industrialized 
countries discovered virtual attacks on their governmental 
networks. In most cases the attackers tried (often succes-
sfully) to access public networks like the British Foreign 
Office, the US Pentagon, or the German Ministry of Exterior 
and others. In the majority of the cases mentioned, the at-
tacks were traced back to Chinese networks, in some cases 
even directly to the Chinese Army (Norton-Taylor, 2007). 
US investigators suspect a Chinese espionage ring they cal-
led Titan Rain to be responsible (Thornburgh, 2005). Alex 
Neill, Asian security analyst at the British Royal United 
Services Institute, declared the attacks could be part of the 
“pressure point warfare“ strategy of China’s Army to we-
aken its opponents by “attacking...specific nodes to leave 
the adversary paralysed“ (Norton-Taylor, 2007).
James Lewis from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in Washington DC is sceptical. 
Following his analysis the Chinese networks’ vulnerability 
could attract third parties with the intention to attack fo-
reign infrastructure and let investigators fall into the easy 
trap of (post-) Cold War logic: 
In the 1980s the Americans looked under their beds 
and believed they saw the KGB; now they believe they 
see the PLA [Peoples Liberation Army]. A hostile 
service from a third country might be drawn to use 
Chinese computers to launch an attack hoping that 
our proclivity to ascribe bad intent to China would 
cloud any investigation. (Lewis, 2005, p. 2). 
Furthermore, Lewis pointed out that also China’s offi-
cials would have used the way over a third country instead 
of leaving a trail back to their own networks. He suggested 
that cybercriminals could be 
responsible for virtual attacks 
on governmental networks 
to sell the information to any 
secret service that is willing to 
pay.
The most extensive cybe-
rattack that was traced back to 
Chinese computers was discovered by researchers at the 
Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of 
Toronto and the Information Warfare Monitor. The results 
of their 10 months lasting research (June 2008 - March 
2009) were published in March 2009. Initial point of the 
research was a request by the Office of the Dalai Lama to 
search its networks for probable malware. The infiltration 
of the office computers was assumed after Chinese officials 
proved to hold information about Tibetian exile politi-
cians that they might have received through the Internet. 
During the investigations the researchers discovered that 
a large number of computers of the Tibetian community 
had been infiltrated by trojans which opened up the syste-
ms for intruders offering them access to content stored in 
the respective networks. Besides that, the attackers created 
the possibility for them to gather information by enabling 
microphones or webcams on the infiltrated computers 
(Deibert; Rohozinski, 2009, p. 34). 
During the investigations the researchers discovered 
that besides Tibetian also a large number of other com-
puters were connected to what they later called GhostNet. 
Between May 2007 and March 2009 at least 1295 compu-
ters from 103 countries were infiltrated by the espionage 
network (Deibert; Rohozinski, 2009, p. 40). 30% of the 
It is unlikely that the Kremlin was directly involved in any 
cyberattacks on Georgia although there are indications that 
officials from the lower political spectrum and the military could 
have been involved or at least have cooperated with virtual 
attackers. 
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networks attacked were considered by the researchers to 
be “high value targets“ like ASEAN and NATO networks, 
embassies and foreign and other ministries of several 
countries like Bangladesh, Brunei, Germany, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Portugal, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, as 
well as news organizations, universities and private com-
panies in Hong Kong, India, Russia the USA and more. 
A strong focus was found on governmental networks in 
South and South East Asia.
Tracing back the attackers, the researchers found 
out that 70% of the servers controlling GhostNet activi-
ties against Tibetian networks 
were located in China (Deibert; 
Rohozinski, 2009, p. 22). The 
rest was dispersed over different 
countries among them Sweden, 
Taiwan and the USA. Also a vast 
amount of servers attacking non-
-Tibetian goals was located in 
China. In this context it is inte-
resting to notice that several ser-
vers were situated on the Chinese 
Hainan Island where intelligence 
and technical army facilities reside. Moreover the concen-
tration on political, economic and military targets in South 
and South East Asian countries indicated that Chinese 
officials could be the operators of GhostNet. Nevertheless 
the report of the Information Warfare Monitor concluded 
that the necessary tools to built up espionage networks 
are available on the net and are not exclusively accessible 
by military or secret service officials. Also cybercriminals 
could build similar networks to gather and sell informa-
tion, although GhostNet has a strong political character 
compared to formerly discovered criminal networks. What 
in turn suggests a non-responsibility of Chinese officials 
is the argument also brought up by James Lewis before, 
stating that other states could have built GhostNet using 
Chinese infrastructure to lead investigators on the wrong 
track.
Considering the cautiousness of the report concerning 
responsibles behind the virtual attacks, it is remarkable to 
compare it to a second one, composed by two researchers 
from the University of Cambridge who also have been 
involved in the research on GhostNet. In “The Snooping 
Dragon“, Shishir Nagaraja and Ross Anderson give a di-
fferent point of view about the origins of GhostNet. They 
clearly stated the responsibility of the Chinese government 
to attack Tibetian networks. In the first sentence of the 
abstract they introduced their paper as treating “a case of 
malware-based electronic surveillance of a political orga-
nization by agents of a nation state.“ (Anderson; Nagaraja, 
2009, p. 3). They further claimed that the “surveillance at-
tack [was] designed to collect intelligence for use by the po-
lice and security service of a repressive state...“ (Anderson; 
Nagaraja, 2009, p. 3). In their conclusion they amplified 
this aspect by pointing out: “People in Tibet may have died 
as a result.“ (Anderson; Nagaraja, 2009, p. 11).
Conclusion
The first decade of the 21st century has seen a rise in 
both quantity and quality of virtual attacks on political and 
economic networks in different countries. Although alrea-
dy in the 1990s information warfare campaigns like in the 
Kosovo war or hacker attacks like between Chinese and 
American citizens took place, since 2004 a growing num-
ber of serious cyber aggressions could be watched. Besides 
website defacements, the spreading of different types of 
malwares, hacking and distributed denial of service attacks 
were among the most applicated measures in several coun-
tries. The motivation of the attackers ranged from pure 
and openly announced destructiveness to secret espionage 
activities. While in the cases of Estonia and Georgia, cy-
ber activities took place parallel to inter-ethnic or military 
conflicts, the GhostNet operators tried to gather informa-
tion from different locations while trying to hide its own 
existence to not endanger the online operations.
The questions of who are the main actors and how to 
trace back virtual attacks are closely connected to each 
other. Analysing the attacks on Estonia and Georgia and 
also the GhostNet activities it is obvious that most victims 
almost automatically refered to Russia and China and in 
general blamed the national governments, its secret ser-
vices or military arms to be responsible. Nevertheless in 
none of the cases it was possible to prove the involvement 
of the respective actors. Comparing different research re-
ports it becomes clear, that some tend to make national 
governments responsible for the reason of logical conclu-
sions based on political relations between different actors. 
One example for this is the Cambridge University report 
on GhostNet in which the authors clearly stated Beijings 
responsibility. A strong argument for the involvement of 
political actors, for example in case of Estonia, is the re-
velation of the Kremlin’s youth organization Nashi as well 
as their financial resources that could make the payment 
In most cases, attackers tried (often successfully) to access 
public networks like the British Foreign Office, 
the US Pentagon, or the German Ministry of 
Exterior and others. In the majority of 
the cases mentioned, the attacks were 
traced back to Chinese networks, in some cases
even directly to the Chinese Army.
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of botnets possible. Also the involvement of botnets used 
against Estonia in former activities against Russian oppo-
sition parties indicate the responsibility of political actors.
In other cases like the Information Warfare Monitor re-
port, the editors pointed out, that a variety of actors could 
be involved, coming from the governmental level or from 
a non-political criminal background. Although informa-
tion gathered during the GhostNet process showed a high 
concentration on political targets, especially in the South 
and South East Asian region, the intruders do not neces-
sarily need to have a political background. Cybercriminal 
activities are a constantly growing phenomenon and while 
some of its protagonist try to enrich themselves by stealing 
creditcard passwords, others might collect and sell politi-
cal information. In this context also the Russian Business 
Network appears as a criminal organization whose servers 
were involved in DDoS attacks in the post-Soviet region. 
The possibility for the RBN to act freely within Russia for 
years must be considered as an international problem of 
cybercrime activities.
Besides possible governmental and cybercriminal par-
ticipation also patriotic hackers and script kiddies play an 
important role in both cases of Russia and China. As they 
usually announce their activities on public online foru-
ms, their participation in different virtual attacks is much 
more obvious. With their big population both Russia and 
especially China pose a certain threat to smaller states’ ne-
tworks as patriotic hacker attacks with a significant num-
ber of participants can cause serious damage. The growing 
number of Internet users in China can in situations of po-
litical tensions be considered a factor of possible network 
instability in competing countries.
The fact that it is impossible to track down responsibles 
for virtual attacks lies also in the impossibility to trace back 
online activities. Although IT analysts frequently spot at-
tacking servers via their IP numbers, it cannot be said for 
sure if those servers are in deed responsible or if they serve 
as proxy servers, disguising the true attackers.
In the coming years the Internet will be accessed by a 
permanently growing number of people. National govern-
ments still have a long way to go to guarantee safe access 
and usage of the net. Therefore the problem of cybersecu-
rity must be taken more seriously by all governments and 
other actors involved. The attention paid by US President 
Obama, as it was mentioned in the introduction of this ar-
ticle, is a clear sign in the right direction. Now other gover-
nments have to take similar measures to enhance the deve-
lopment of cybersecurity policies on a global scale. Badly 
protected networks can result in the breakdown of crucial 
infrastructure which espe-
cially in times of political cri-
ses can make a country extre-
mely vulnerable. Considering 
the results of this article, the 
words of Joseph Nye so far will 
remain true: “In the murky 
world of the Internet, attackers 
are difficult to identify.“ (Nye, 
2008, p. 1).
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